

Combining Agda with External Tools

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Integrating External Tools via Builtins

Integrating λ -Prolog into Agda

Connecting Agda with why3 and SPARK Ada


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Karim Kanso (PhD thesis) Verification of Real World Railway Interlocking Systems using Agda

Example of Railway Interlocking System:



Approach

- ▶ We have a control program P which depending on commands and detected trains in segments sets the signals and sets of points.
- ▶ So we have vectors of Booleans expressing
 - ▶ the state of the system $\overrightarrow{\text{State}}$,
 - ▶ and the inputs $\overrightarrow{\text{Input}}$.
- ▶ P can be expressed as Boolean valued formulae

$$\varphi_P(\overrightarrow{\text{State}}_{\text{in}}, \overrightarrow{\text{Input}}, \overrightarrow{\text{State}}_{\text{out}})$$

Proof of Safety in Agda

- ▶ We can write a **simulator in Agda** for this programs, which moves trains, around, provided they obey signals and executes P .
- ▶ A state of the program is safe if
 - ▶ there are never two trains in the same train segment,
 - ▶ more conditions esp. regarding sets of points.
- ▶ P is safe if from specific allowed initial states when running the program and moving trains one never reaches an unsafe state.
- ▶ Difficult to do directly in Agda because φ_P is very complex.
- ▶ Instead **separate** tasks between interactive theorem proving (ITP) and automated theorem proving (ATP).
 - ▶ By ATP we mean here SAT solvers and model checkers
 - ▶ Later we discuss as well other ATP tools.

Distribution of Tasks between interactive and automated theorem proving

- ▶ Introduce safety conditions $\varphi_{\text{safe}}(\overrightarrow{\text{State}})$ and invariants $\varphi_{\text{invariant}}(\overrightarrow{\text{State}})$
- ▶ Prove using **ATP** certain signalling principles

$$(\varphi_{\text{safe}}(\overrightarrow{\text{State}}_{\text{in}}) \wedge \varphi_{\text{invariant}}(\overrightarrow{\text{State}}_{\text{in}}) \wedge \varphi_P(\overrightarrow{\text{State}}_{\text{in}}, \overrightarrow{\text{Input}}, \overrightarrow{\text{State}}_{\text{out}})) \rightarrow \varphi_{\text{safe}}(\overrightarrow{\text{State}}_{\text{out}}) \wedge \varphi_{\text{invariant}}(\overrightarrow{\text{State}}_{\text{out}})$$

- ▶ Prove using **ITP** that signalling principles imply that P is safe.
- ▶ In order to get a complete proof in Agda, we need
 - ▶ not only that ATP returns value true,
 - ▶ but as well that this implies that the checked formula is true.

Approach in Karim's Thesis [1, 2, 3, 4].

- ▶ Develop a naive SAT solver or model checker in Agda, and show it is sound:

check : Formula \rightarrow Bool

sound : (φ : Formula) \rightarrow T (check φ) \rightarrow (ξ : Env) \rightarrow $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket \xi$

- ▶ We override the `check` function by a **Builtin**, which calls an efficient SAT solver or model checker.
- ▶ Function `sound` links the result `check` from ATP to the validity of a formula which can be used in ITP.
- ▶ Now we get
 - ▶ Using ATP we check that signalling principles hold
 - ▶ Using the Builtin we translate the results into validity of the signalling principles in Agda.
 - ▶ Using ITP we prove that this implies that the system is safe.

Need for Flexible Builtins

- ▶ In order to get this machinery work we need two Builtins.
 - ▶ The function check.
 - ▶ The type of formulas `Formula`.
- ▶ For more complex logics (e.g. for model checking) one needs a **cascade of Builtins**.
- ▶ Approach relies on trusting the ATP tool giving correct result.

Using Builtins for Proof Search

- ▶ Karim linked as well tools for **proof search** to Agda using Builtins.
 - ▶ Karim used a SAT solver so the tool was total.
 - ▶ Here we show how to extend this to semi decision procedures.
- ▶ Assume you have an ATP tool which searches for proofs for certain formulas.

- ▶ We have

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{Formula} & : \text{Set} \\ \text{Proof} & : \text{Formula} \rightarrow \text{Set} \end{array}$$

- ▶ The ATP tool gives a function

$$\text{poofsearch} : (\varphi : \text{Formula}) \rightarrow \text{Maybe} (\text{Proof } \varphi)$$

- ▶ In Agda we can postulate such a function

$$\text{postulate poofsearch} : (\varphi : \text{Formula}) \rightarrow \text{Maybe} (\text{Proof } \varphi)$$

and override it using a builtin by the ATP tool.

Using Builtins for Proof Search

- ▶ In Agda we prove soundness

$$\text{sound} : (\varphi : \text{Formula}) \rightarrow \text{Proof } \varphi \rightarrow (\xi : \text{Env}) \rightarrow \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket \xi$$

- ▶ We define

$$\text{extract} : \{X : \text{Set}\} \rightarrow (p : \text{Maybe } X) \rightarrow \text{IsJust } p \rightarrow X$$

- ▶ Therefore we get a proof

$$\text{sound } \varphi (\text{extract } (\text{poofsearch } \varphi) \text{ isJust}) : (\xi : \text{Env}) \rightarrow \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket \xi$$

provided `poofsearch` φ returns a just value

(type checking will run the external tool when checking

`isJust : IsJust (poofsearch φ)`).

Advantages/Disadvantages of Approach using Profs

- ▶ Advantages
 - ▶ No reliance on the soundness of the ATP tool.
 - ▶ No need to write a naive implementation of the tool.
 - ▶ Allows as well ATP tools for semi decidable logics or which for other reasons don't always give an answer.
- ▶ Disadvantages
 - ▶ Slower to use since ATP tool needs to create a proof.
 - ▶ Restricts ATP tools available.
 - ▶ Especially model checkers usually don't provide proofs.
 - ▶ Tedious to translate ATP proofs into Agda
 - ▶ lack of documentation,
 - ▶ scripts not intended to be converted into Agda proofs.

Flexible Builtin Mechanism

- ▶ Builtins can be used for other purposes as well
 - ▶ cryptographic functions,
 - ▶ any computational complex functions.
- ▶ Karim added a flexible mechanism for adding builtins to Agda.

Caveats

- ▶ Allowing to add new builtins in Agda code causes a **security problem**, because it allows to execute arbitrary programs during type checking.
 - ▶ Solution: require that adding new builtin mechanism requires recompilation of Agda.
- ▶ Builtins are only **consistent** if the output of the builtin tool coincides with the the output of Agda.
 - ▶ Requires **checks** in Agda.
 - ▶ In case of **overridden postulates** requires that the original function was indeed a postulate.
- ▶ Karim's approach is reasonably flexible but still requires some programming.
 - ▶ A too generic approach will probably become inefficient.
 - ▶ Karim wrote a **domain specific language** for this to make it easy to add Builtins.

Code Sprint

- ▶ Karim created a branch [3] of Agda with his implementation of Builtins.
- ▶ Documented esp. in Appendix D and Sect. 5 of his PhD Thesis [1].
- ▶ Agda code and other material available from [2] (linked as well from the AIM XXXII webpage, see Code Sprint on Builtins)
- ▶ Goal of code sprint is to update it and integrate it into main Agda.

Integrating External Tools via Builtins

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Connecting Agda with why3 and SPARK Ada

Presented by Stephan Adelsberger

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SPARK Ada

- ▶ SPARK Ada is a tool set used in industry for developing safety critical systems.
- ▶ It extends Ada programs by adding data/information flow analysis and Hoare logic.
- ▶ Hoare logic allows to add pre-, post conditions to a program plus intermediate conditions, especially loop invariants.

Example

```

procedure Correct_Increment(X : in out Integer)
  with Depends => (X => X),
  Pre          => X >= 0,
  Post       => X = X'Old + 1 and X >= 1;

procedure body Correct_Increment(X : in out Integer) is
  begin
    X := X + 1;
  end Correct_Increment;


```

Why3 Platform

- ▶ SPARK Ada uses the Why3 system from **INRIA**.
- ▶ Why3 is a tool which converts imperative code from the intermediate languages mlw and code from the language why3 into generated verification conditions which are then fed into various³
 - ▶ automated theorem provers
Alt-ergo, Beagle, CVC3, CVC4, E prover, Gappa, Metis, Metitatrski, Princess, Psyche, Simplify, SPASS, Vampire, veriT, Yices, Ze.
 - ▶ interactive theorem provers
Coq, PVC and Isabelle/HOL.
- ▶ SPARK Ada uses the why3 system to generate from a program and pre-/post-conditions and intermediate conditions verification conditions and feed them into the automated theorem prover alt-ergo.

³<http://why3.lri.fr/>

Architecture of Why3 Platform



(Source: <http://why3.lri.fr/queens/queens.pdf>)

Result of Applying Why3 to .mlw Files

Why3 Interactive Proof Session

File View Tools Help

Context

Unproved goals

All goals

Categories

Compute

Inline

Split

Provers

CVC3 (2.4.1)

CVC4 (1.4)

CVC4 (1.4 noBV)

Z3 (4.5.1)

Goals

Edit

Replay

Remove

Clean

Proof monitoring

Waiting: 0

Scheduled: 0

Running: 0

Theories/Goals	Status	Time
Standard_long_integer_axiom	✓	0.00
Standard_long_long_integer_axiom	✓	0.00
Standard_natural_axiom	✓	0.00
Standard_positive_axiom	✓	0.00
Standard_short_float_axiom	✓	0.00
Standard_float_axiom	✓	0.00
Standard_long_float_axiom	✓	0.00
Standard_long_long_float_axiom	✓	0.00
Standard_character_axiom	✓	0.00
Standard_wide_character_axiom	✓	0.00
Standard_wide_wide_character_axiom	✓	0.00
Standard_string_axiom	✓	0.00
Standard_wide_string_axiom	✓	0.00
Standard_wide_wide_string_axiom	✓	0.00
Standard_duration_axiom	✓	0.00
Standard_integer_8_axiom	✓	0.00
Standard_integer_16_axiom	✓	0.00
Standard_integer_32_axiom	✓	0.00
Standard_integer_64_axiom	✓	0.00
Standard_universal_integer_axiom	✓	0.00
Standard_universal_real_axiom	✓	0.00
Wrong_increment_axiom	✓	0.00
Wrong_increment_subprogram_def	?	
VC for def	?	
split_goal_wp	?	
1. precondition	?	
2. precondition	?	
3. postcondition	?	

Source code Task Edited proof Prover Output Counter-example

```

381
382 (* clone ada_model.Static_Discrete with type t19 = inte
383 type us_split3 = us_split,
384 predicate dynamic_property3 = dynamic_property1,
385 predicate in_range3 = in_range1, constant last3 = last1,
386 constant first3 = first1, constant dummy3 = dummy,
387 function user_eq3 = user_eq, function of_rep3 = of_rep,
388 function to_rep3 = to_rep,
389 function attr__ATTRIBUTE_VALUE4 = attr__ATTRIBUTE_VALUE1
390 predicate attr__ATTRIBUTE_VALUE__pre_check4 = attr__ATTR
391 function attr__ATTRIBUTE_IMAGE4 = attr__ATTRIBUTE_IMAGE1
392 function bool_eq5 = bool_eq2, prop coerce_axiom1 = coerc
393 prop range_axiom2 = range_axiom,
394 prop inversion_axiom2 = inversion_axiom *)
395
396 (* use Standard__integer *)
397
398 constant attr__ATTRIBUTE_ADDRESS : int
399
400 (* use Wrong_increment__x *)
401
402 (* use Standard__integer_axiom *)
403
404 (* use Wrong_increment__x_axiom *)
405
406 constant x : int
407
408 axiom H : dynamic_property1 first1 last1 x
409
410 axiom H1 : x >= 0
411
412 constant o : int = x + x
413
414 goal WP_parameter_def : in_range1 o
415 end

```

Need for Interactive Theorem Provers

- ▶ SPARK Ada works well when having verification conditions in propositional logic.
- ▶ As soon as one introduces quantifiers, one quickly reaches the limit of automated theorem provers.
- ▶ Workaround is to write verification conditions in propositional logic.

- ▶ Instead of writing

$$\forall \text{signal}_1, \text{signal}_2 : \text{Signal.oppose}(\text{signal}_1, \text{signal}_2) \wedge \text{IsGreen}(\text{signal}_1) \rightarrow \text{IsRed}(\text{signal}_2)$$

- ▶ one writes instead for each concrete signals $\text{signal}_1, \text{signal}_2$ opposing each others

$$\text{IsGreen}(\text{signal}_1) \rightarrow \text{IsRed}(\text{signal}_2)$$

- ▶ Specification becomes very long (lots and lots of conditions) and it is likely to overlook a condition.
- ▶ Instead of a program errors one is facing specification errors.

Incorporating Hoare Logic into Agda

- ▶ Therefore a good idea to link ITP tools such a Agda to why3.
- ▶ Linking Agda to why3 would provide an easy way of getting Hoare logic into Agda.
- ▶ It would allow to verify “real” programs in Agda.
- ▶ Will certainly depend on integration of ATP tools in Agda.

Bibliography I



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PhD thesis, Dept. of Computer Science, Swansea University, Swansea SA2 8PP, UK, August 2012.

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[//www.swan.ac.uk/~csetzer/articlesFromOthers/index.html](http://www.swan.ac.uk/~csetzer/articlesFromOthers/index.html)

and <http://cs.swan.ac.uk/~cskarim/files/>.



K. Kanso.

Code of phd thesis, February 2013.

<http://www.cs.swan.ac.uk/~csetzer/articlesFromOthers/index.html>.

Main code

Bibliography II

<http://www.cs.swan.ac.uk/~csetzer/articlesFromOthers/kanso/codeKansoPhDThesis.zip>;

Agda fork

<https://github.com/kazkansouh/agda>;

material regarding the interlocking of the historic railway Gwili

[http:](http://www.cs.swan.ac.uk/~csetzer/articlesFromOthers/kanso/karimKansoPhDThesisAgdaAsAPlatformForVerifiedRailwaysGwili.tar.bz2)

[//www.cs.swan.ac.uk/~csetzer/articlesFromOthers/kanso/karimKansoPhDThesisAgdaAsAPlatformForVerifiedRailwaysGwili.tar.bz2](http://www.cs.swan.ac.uk/~csetzer/articlesFromOthers/kanso/karimKansoPhDThesisAgdaAsAPlatformForVerifiedRailwaysGwili.tar.bz2).



K. Kanso.

Agda, 3 September 2017.

Github repository, fork of Agda installation, containing code from PhD thesis Karim Kanso.

Bibliography III



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A light-weight integration of automated and interactive theorem proving.

[Mathematical Structures in Computer Science](#), FirstView:1–25, 12 November 2014.