CSCM10 Research Methodology Specification and Verification

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http://www.cs.swan.ac.uk/~csetzer/lectures/computerScienceProjectResearchMethods/current/index.html

Monday 13 November 2017

- 1 Critical Systems
- 2 Specification
- 3 Verification
- 4 Dependent Type Theory
- Security
- **6** Theoretical Topics

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Definition


Definition: A critical system is a

- computer, electronic or electromechanical system
- the failure of which may have serious consequences, such as
 - substantial financial losses.
 - substantial environmental damage,
 - injuries or death of human beings.

Example 1: Nuclear Power







Example: Medical Devices








Example: Embedded Systems in Automobile Industry







Example: Railways







Failure of a Critical System



Failure of a Critical System








Industrial Partners of Swansea Group in Safe and Secure Systems










Swansea Safe and Secure Systems Group

- The department of Computer Science has a big group working on logic, theoretical computer science and applications to verification of software and hardware.
- Long experience in working with verification of software and hardware.
- Industrial connections with companies such as Rolls Royce,
 Developers of Electronic Payment Systems, Siemens.

Swansea Safe and Secure Systems Group

- Well established collaboration with Siemens Rail Automation (Chippenham, formerly Invensys Railsystems) on modelling and verification of new generations of railway interlocking systems.
 - Currently working on radio controlled moving block systems (ERTMS).





Expertise of Swansea Group on Safe and Secure Systems

- Verification in the Railway Domain
 - Ulrich Berger
 - Phil James
 - Faron Moller
 - Liam O'Reilly
 - Markus Roggenbach
 - Monika Seisenberger
 - Anton Setzer
- Embedded Systems and Testing
 - Arnold Beckmann,
 - Markus Roggenbach.

- 1 Critical Systems
- 2 Specification
- 3 Verification
- 4 Dependent Type Theory
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- 6 Theoretical Topics

Why Formal Specification?

- Natural language specification can be ambiguous.
 - "The output is a red light or a green light".
 - Do you mean "either or" or "inclusive or"?

Why Formal Specification?

- Formal specification enforce precision.
 - Example: If the level of the water in the tank is above a certain level, the plug valve must be closed.
 Do you mean
 - maximum level,
 - average,
 - medium,
 - or ... (lots of other possibilities)?

Why Formal Specification?

• Natural language specifications don't allow formal verification.

Challenges in Specification

- Finding a suitable language which is
 - expressive
 - and simple enough for the user to understand it.
- Describe the meaning of specification languages (semantics).
- For specifying a formal system, determine the right
 - · notions,
 - level of abstraction

Example

- Distant signals and main signal in railways.
 - the main signal a function of the distant signal,
 - or the distant signal a function of the main signal,
 - or are main signal and distant signal in a relation.
- During specification, often need to switch between different choices.
- General problem of modelling systems.

Expertise of Swansea Safe and Secure Systems Group

- Algebraic Specification.
 - Markus Roggenbach (CASL)
 - John Tucker (theory of algebraic specification)
- Process Algebras
 - Faron Moller (CCS),
 - Markus Roggenbach (CSP-CASL),
 - Anton Setzer (CSP-Agda).

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Verification

- Verification is the process of determining whether a software product coincides with its specification.
- Many methods.
- Main method is testing.
- Testing usually not complete.
- In order to guarantee that a program is guaranteed to be correct, one needs prove that the output of software coincides with the specification.
 - Necessary especially for critical systems.
 - Increasingly used for general systems, e.g. by Microsoft, to guarantee security of its software.
- · Done using theorem proving techniques.

1. Theorem proving by hand.

- What mathematicians do all the time.
- Will remain in the near future the main way for proving theorems.
- Problem: Errors.
 - As in programs after a certain amount of lines there is a bug, after a certain amount of lines a proof has a bug.
 - The problem can only be reduced by careful proof checking, but not eliminated completely.
- Unsuitable for verifying large software and hardware systems.
 - Data usually too large.
 - Likely that one makes the same mistakes as in the software.

2. Theorem proving with some machine support.

- Machine checks the syntax of the statements, creates a good layout, translates it into different languages.
- Theorem proving still to be done by hand.
- **Example:** most systems for specification of software.
- Advantages:
 - I_ess errors.
 - User is forced to obey a certain syntax.
 - Specifications can be exchanged more easily.
- Disadvantage: Similar to 1.

3. Interactive Theorem Proving.

- Proofs are fully checked by the system.
- Proof steps have to be carried out by the user.
- · Advantages:
 - Correctness guaranteed (provided the theorem prover is correct).
 - Everything which can be proved by hand, should be possible to be proved in such systems.

- (Interactive theorem proving)
 - · Disadvantages:
 - It takes much longer than proving by hand.
 - Similar to programming:
 To say in words what a program should do, doesn't take long.
 To write the actual program, can take a long time, since much more details are involved than expected.
 - Requires experts in theorem proving.

4. Automated Theorem Proving.

- The theorem is shown by the machine.
- It is the task of the user to
 - state the theorem,
 - bring it into a form so that it can be solved,
 - usually adapt certain parameters so that the theorem proving solves the problem within reasonable amount of time.

- (Automated theorem proving)
 - Advantages
 - Less complicated to "feed the theorem into the machine" rather than actually proving it.
 Might be done by non-specialists.
 - Sometimes faster than interactive theorem proving.

- (Automated theorem proving)
 - Disadvantages
 - Many problems cannot be proved automatically.
 - Can often deal only with finite problems.
 - We can show the correctness of one particular processor.
 - But we cannot show a theorem, stating the correctness of a parametric unit (like a generic n-bit adder for arbitrary n.
 - In some cases this can be overcome.
 - Limits on what can be done (some hardware problems can be verified as 32 bit versions, but not as 64 bit versions).

Verification in Industry

- Most verification done using testing.
- Some theorem proving by hand and with some machine support done.
- Increasingly theorem proving using automated theorem proving done.
 - Investment of Microsoft in various automated theorem provers.
 - Package management in Linux became much faster due to use of SAT solvers (Automated Theorem Provers).

Verification in Industry

- Interactive theorem proving on its way into industry.
 - Typical scenario:
 - General properties of a system proved used interactive theorem proving
 - E.g. signalling principles formally expressed safety.
 - That a concrete installation is in accordance with those general principles done using automated theorem proving.
 - E.g. show that a railway interlocking system fulfils signalling principles.

Expertise of Verification

- Verification using automated theorem provers (ATP).
 - Oliver Kullmann (SAT solvers, e.g. OK-Solver)
- Verification using interactive theorem provers (ITP).
 - Markus Roggenbach (Isabelle),
 - Ulrich Berger (Minlog, Coq),
 - Monika Seisenberger (Minlog),
 - Anton Setzer (Agda).


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- 2 Specification
- 3 Verification
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Agda


- Agda is a theorem prover which is as well a prototype of a dependently typed programming language.
- In Agda proofs and programs are the same.
- A proof of a theorem A is a program p of type A written as

- Relatively easy for programmers, since they don't need to learn a different activity.
- Agda uses the novel concept of dependent types.
- In Swansea Anton Setzer is expert in Agda.

Example: Boolean Circuits



What is a Component?



A Boolean Component can be represented by a

$$f: \operatorname{Bool}^n \to \operatorname{Bool}^m$$

What is the type $Bool^n \to Bool^m$?

- $Bool^n \to Bool^m$ is a type depending on $n, m : \mathbb{N}$.
- In most languages you don't have any dependent type. You need to replace this by $\operatorname{List}(\operatorname{Bool}) \to \operatorname{List}(\operatorname{Bool})$.
- In C++ you can define

$$Bool^n \to Bool^m$$

but only, if n, m are known at compile time.

- Disallows dynamic dependencies, e.g. depending on user input.
- In Agda we can directly use Boolⁿ → Bool^m as a dependent type.

Example 2: Grammars

- Assume you want to write programs which manipulate Java programs.
 - E.g. change a variable not using brute query replace.
- One way of doing this:
 - Define a data type of Java programs.
 - Translate strings into this data type and back again.
 - Write programs which work on this data type of Java programs.

Example 2: Grammars

An oversimplified grammar for Java might start as follows:

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Transformers of Java Programs

- Let Grammarsymbol be the set of terminals and non-terminals (JavaProg, JavaProgbody, ...).
- For each Grammarsymbol S we define the type [[S]] of entities of this type, e.g.
 - [TypeDecl] = String.
 - [VariableName] = String.
 - $[VariableDecl] = String \times String.$
- [[S]] is a **dependent type** depending on S: GrammarSymbol.

Type of the Parser

Parser : $(GrammarSymbol \times String) \rightarrow Bool$

 $\begin{array}{ll} \text{Transformer} & : & \left(\mathcal{S} : \text{GrammarSymbol} \right) \\ & \rightarrow \left(\mathcal{s} : \text{String} \right) \\ & \rightarrow \text{Parser}(\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{s}) == \text{true} \\ & \rightarrow \left[\! \left[\mathcal{S} \right] \! \right] \end{array}$

- Makes heavy use of the dependent type [S].
- Parser Libraries in C++, Haskell, Agda have been built based on this idea.

Generative Programming

- These are examples of generative programming.
- In generative programming you want to build highly generic programs, which generate and manipulate programs from elements of data types.


Generative Programming

- So we have
 - a base data type BaseType (like GrammarSymbol before),
 - a type of programs Program(S) based on S: BaseType (like [S]] before),
 - operations which manipulate Program(S), e.g.

```
\begin{array}{ll} \operatorname{transform1} & : & ((S : \operatorname{BaseType1}) \times \operatorname{Program1}(S)) \\ & \to \operatorname{BaseType2} \\ \operatorname{transform2} & : & ((S : \operatorname{BaseType1}) \times \operatorname{Program1}(S)) \\ & \to \operatorname{Program2}(\operatorname{transform1}(S, s)) \end{array}
```

Generative Programming

- Now we can create factories for generating programs.
- Replace handcrafted programs by generated programs.
- Similar to step from pre-industrial to industrial age.



Dependent Types for Writing Verified Programs

- Assume we want to assign a type to a sorting function sort on lists of natural numbers.
- In most programming language, the type of it is essentially

$$sort : NatList \rightarrow NatList$$

for the type of lists of natural numbers NatList.

 In dependent type theory, we can demand more correctness, namely that its type is

$$sort : NatList \rightarrow SortedList$$
.

• We assume some notion of NatList (list of natural numbers).

SortedList

- What is SortedList?
 - An element of SortedList is a list which is sorted.
 - It is a pair $\langle I, p \rangle$ s.t.
 - / is a NatList.
 - p is a proof or verification that I is sorted:
 - p : Sorted(I).

Sorted Lists

- For the moment, ignore what is meant by Sorted(I) as a type.
- Only important: Sorted(1) depends on 1.
 - Sorted(*I*) is a predicate expressed as a type.
- Elements of SortedList are pairs $\langle I, p \rangle$ s.t.
 - /: NatList.
 - p : Sorted(I).
- Sorted(*I*) is a dependent type.

Sorted Lists (Cont.)

- An element of Sorted(1) will be a **proof** that 1 is sorted.
- If / is sorted, then Sorted(/) will be provable, and therefore will have an element.
 - It is possible to write a program which computes an element of Sorted(I).
- If I is not sorted, then Sorted(I) will have no proof and it will therefore no element.
 - Then it is not possible to write a program which computes an element of Sorted(I).

The Dependent Product

• Then the pair $\langle I, p \rangle$ will be an element of

```
SortedList := (I : NatList) \times Sorted(I).
```

- SortedList is the type of pairs $\langle I, p \rangle$ s.t.
 - /: NatList,
 - p : Sorted(I).

called the dependent product

- sort : NatList \rightarrow ((/ : NatList) \times Sorted(/)) expresses:
 - · sort converts lists into sorted lists.

The Dependent Function Type

- From a sorting function we know more:
 - It takes a list and converts it into a sorted list with the same elements.
- Assume a type (or predicate) EqElements(I, I') standing for
 - I and I' have the same elements.

The Dependent Function Type

A refined version of sort has type

```
(\mathit{I} : \mathrm{NatList}) \rightarrow ((\mathit{I}' : \mathrm{NatList}) \times \mathrm{Sorted}(\mathit{I}') \times \mathrm{EqElements}(\mathit{I}, \mathit{I}'))
```

- "sort(I) is a list, which is sorted and has the same elements".
- "sort is a program, which takes a list and returns a sorted list with the same elements."
- The type of sort is an instance of the dependent function type:
 - The result type depends on the arguments.

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Topics in Security

- Cyberterrorism, General Security
 - Monika Seisenberger, Anton Setzer.
- Cryptocurrencies (Bitcoins, Blockchain).
 - Anton Setzer

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Theoretical Topics

- Computability Theory and Limits of Computation
 - Ulrich Berger, Jens Blanck, Monika Seisenberger, John Tucker,
- Exact Real Number Computation
 - Ulrich Berger, Jens Blanck, Monika Seisenberger.
- Program Extraction
 - Ulrich Berger, Monika Seisenberger
- Proof Theory
 - Arnold Beckmann, Ulrich Berger, Monika Seisenberger, Anton Setzer, Jean Razafindrakoto.

Theoretical Topics

- Complexity Theory
 - Arnold Beckmann, Oliver Kullmann, Faron Moller, Jean Razafindrakoto.
- Formal Argumentation
 - X. Fan.

Conclusion

- Critical Systems require more formal specification and verification.
- Expertise in Swansea in specification and verification.
- Problems of natural language specification can be overcome by formal specification.
- Verification techniques from proving by hand to interactive and automated theorem proving.
- Agda as an example of a programming language based on dependent types.
- Use of dependent types for generative programming.
- Research related to Security.
- Wide range of theoretical topics covered in Swansea.