CSCM10 Research Methodology Specification and Verification

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http://www.cs.swan.ac.uk/~csetzer/lectures/ computerScienceProjectResearchMethods/current/index.html

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Critical Systems Specification Verification Dependent Type Theory Security Theoretical Topics

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Definition


1 Critical Systems

- **2** Specification
- **3** Verification
- **4** Dependent Type Theory
- **5** Security
- **6** Theoretical Topics

Definition: A critical system is a

- computer, electronic or electromechanical system
- the failure of which may have serious consequences, such as
 - substantial financial losses,
 - substantial environmental damage,
 - injuries or death of human beings.

Example 1: Nuclear Power



Example: Embedded Systems in Automobile Industry

Example: Medical Devices








Example: Railways

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Failure of a Critical System









n and Verification

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Industrial Partners Systems	of Swansea Group in	Safe and Secure	Swansea Safe and	Secure Sys

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ystems Group

Invensys™ rail group








- The department of Computer Science has a big group working on logic, theoretical computer science and applications to verification of software and hardware.
- Long experience in working with verification of software and hardware.
- Industrial connections with companies such as Rolls Royce, Developers of Electronic Payment Systems, Siemens.

- Well established collaboration with Siemens Rail Automation (Chippenham, formerly Invensys Railsystems) on modelling and verification of new generations of railway interlocking systems.
 - Currently working on radio controlled moving block systems (ERTMS).





- Verification in the Railway Domain
 - Ulrich Berger
 - Phil James
 - Faron Moller
 - Liam O'Reilly
 - Markus Roggenbach
 - Monika Seisenberger
 - Anton Setzer
- Embedded Systems and Testing
 - Arnold Beckmann,
 - Markus Roggenbach.

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			Why Formal Specifi	ication?	
Critical Systems					
2 Specification					
3 Verification				ge specification can be ambiguou t is a red light or a green light".	IS.

- **4** Dependent Type Theory
- **5** Security
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• Do you mean "either or" or "inclusive or"?

- Formal specification enforce precision.
 - Example: If the level of the water in the tank is above a certain level, the plug valve must be closed. Do you mean
 - maximum level,
 - average,
 - medium,
 - or ... (lots of other possibilities)?

• Natural language specifications don't allow formal verification.

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Challenges in Spec	cification		Example		

- Finding a suitable language which is
 - expressive
 - and simple enough for the user to understand it.
- Describe the meaning of specification languages (semantics).
- For specifying a formal system, determine the right
 - notions,
 - level of abstraction

- Distant signals and main signal in railways. Is
 - the main signal a function of the distant signal,
 - or the distant signal a function of the main signal,
 - or are main signal and distant signal in a relation.
- During specification, often need to switch between different choices.
- General problem of modelling systems.

- Algebraic Specification.
 - Markus Roggenbach (CASL)
 - John Tucker (theory of algebraic specification)
- Process Algebras
 - Faron Moller (CCS),
 - Markus Roggenbach (CSP-CASL),
 - Anton Setzer (CSP-Agda).

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Verification			4 Ways of Provi	ng Theorems	

- Verification is the process of determining whether a software product coincides with its specification.
- Many methods.
- Main method is testing.
- Testing usually not complete.
- In order to guarantee that a program is guaranteed to be correct, one needs prove that the output of software coincides with the specification.
 - Necessary especially for critical systems.
 - Increasingly used for general systems, e.g. by Microsoft, to guarantee security of its software.
- Done using theorem proving techniques.

1. Theorem proving by hand.

- What mathematicians do all the time.
- Will remain in the near future the main way for proving theorems.
- Problem: Errors.
 - As in programs after a certain amount of lines there is a bug, after a certain amount of lines a proof has a bug.
 - The problem can only be reduced by careful proof checking, but not eliminated completely.
- Unsuitable for verifying large software and hardware systems.
 - Data usually too large.
 - Likely that one makes the same mistakes as in the software.

4 Ways of Proving Theorems

4 Ways of Proving Theorems

2. Theorem proving with some machine support.

- Machine checks the syntax of the statements, creates a good layout, translates it into different languages.
- Theorem proving still to be done by hand.
- **Example:** most systems for specification of software.
- Advantages:
 - Less errors.
 - User is forced to obey a certain syntax.
 - Specifications can be exchanged more easily.
- Disadvantage: Similar to 1.

3. Interactive Theorem Proving.

- Proofs are fully checked by the system.
- Proof steps have to be carried out by the user.
- Advantages:
 - Correctness guaranteed (provided the theorem prover is correct).
 - Everything which can be proved by hand, should be possible to be proved in such systems.

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4 Ways of Proving	Theorems		4 Ways of Proving	g Theorems	

- (Interactive theorem proving)
 - Disadvantages:
 - It takes much longer than proving by hand.
 - Similar to programming:
 - To say in words what a program should do, doesn't take long. To write the actual program, can take a long time, since much more details are involved than expected.
 - Requires experts in theorem proving.

4. Automated Theorem Proving.

- The theorem is shown by the machine.
- It is the task of the user to
 - state the theorem,
 - bring it into a form so that it can be solved,
 - usually adapt certain parameters so that the theorem proving solves the problem within reasonable amount of time.

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- (Automated theorem proving)
 - Advantages
 - Less complicated to "feed the theorem into the machine" rather than actually proving it. Might be done by non-specialists.
 - Sometimes faster than interactive theorem proving.

- (Automated theorem proving)
 - Disadvantages
 - Many problems cannot be proved automatically.
 - Can often deal only with finite problems.
 - We can show the correctness of one particular processor.
 - But we cannot show a theorem, stating the correctness of a parametric unit (like a generic *n*-bit adder for arbitrary *n*.
 - In some cases this can be overcome.
 - Limits on what can be done (some hardware problems can be verified as 32 bit versions, but not as 64 bit versions).

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Verification in Indu	stry		Verification in Ir	ndustry	

- Most verification done using testing.
- Some theorem proving by hand and with some machine support done.
- Increasingly theorem proving using automated theorem proving done.
 - Investment of Microsoft in various automated theorem provers.
 - Package management in Linux became much faster due to use of SAT solvers (Automated Theorem Provers).

- Interactive theorem proving on its way into industry.
 - Typical scenario:
 - General properties of a system proved used interactive theorem proving
 - E.g. signalling principles formally expressed safety.
 - That a concrete installation is in accordance with those general principles done using automated theorem proving.
 - E.g. show that a railway interlocking system fulfils signalling principles.

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Expertise of Verification

- Verification using automated theorem provers (ATP).
 - Oliver Kullmann (SAT solvers, e.g. OK-Solver)
- Verification using interactive theorem provers (ITP).
 - Markus Roggenbach (Isabelle),
 - Ulrich Berger (Minlog, Coq),
 - Monika Seisenberger (Minlog),
 - Anton Setzer (Agda).

Critical Systems


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Agda			Example: Boolean	Circuits	

- Agda is a theorem prover which is as well a prototype of a dependently typed programming language.
- In Agda proofs and programs are the same.
- A proof of a theorem A is a program p of type A written as

p : *A*

- Relatively easy for programmers, since they don't need to learn a different activity.
- Agda uses the novel concept of dependent types.
- In Swansea Anton Setzer is expert in Agda.





• In Agda we can directly use $\operatorname{Bool}^n \to \operatorname{Bool}^m$ as a dependent type.

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Example 2: Gramm	iars		Example 2: Gra	immars	

• Assume you want to write programs which manipulate Java programs.

 $f: \operatorname{Bool}^n \to \operatorname{Bool}^m$

- E.g. change a variable not using brute query replace.
- One way of doing this:
 - Define a data type of Java programs.
 - Translate strings into this data type and back again.
 - Write programs which work on this data type of Java programs.

• An oversimplified grammar for Java might start as follows:

JavaProg	\longrightarrow	"class" identifier "{" JavaProgBody "}"
JavaProgBody	\longrightarrow	(VariableDecl) [*] (MethodDecl) [*]
VariableDecl	\longrightarrow	TypeDecl VariableName ";"

Transformers of Java Programs

- Let Grammarsymbol be the set of terminals and non-terminals (JavaProg, JavaProgbody, ...).
- For each Grammarsymbol S we define the type [[S]] of entities of this type, e.g.
 - [[TypeDecl]] = String.
 - [[VariableName]] = String.
 - $\llbracket VariableDecl \rrbracket = String \times String.$
- **[***S* **]** is a **dependent type** depending on
 - ${\pmb S}: {\rm GrammarSymbol}.$

Type of the Parser

Parser : $(GrammarSymbol \times String) \rightarrow Bool$

$$\begin{array}{rll} \text{Transformer} & : & (S : \text{GrammarSymbol}) \\ & \rightarrow (s : \text{String}) \\ & \rightarrow \text{Parser}(S, s) == \text{true} \\ & \rightarrow \llbracket S \rrbracket \end{array}$$

- Makes heavy use of the dependent type [[S]].
- Parser Libraries in C++, Haskell, Agda have been built based on this idea.

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Generative Program	nming		Generative Prog	ramming	

- These are examples of generative programming.
- In generative programming you want to build highly generic programs, which generate and manipulate programs from elements of data types.

- So we have
 - a base data type BaseType (like GrammarSymbol before),
 - a type of programs Program(S) based on S : BaseType (like [[S]] before),
 - operations which manipulate $\operatorname{Program}(S)$, e.g.

transform1 : $((S : BaseType1) \times Program1(S))$ $\rightarrow BaseType2$ transform2 : $((S : BaseType1) \times Program1(S))$

 $\rightarrow \operatorname{Program2}(\operatorname{transform1}(S, s))$

Generative Programming

- Now we can create factories for generating programs.
- Replace handcrafted programs by generated programs.
- Similar to step from pre-industrial to industrial age.

Krzysztof Czarnecki

Ulrich W. Eisenecker



sort : NatList \rightarrow SortedList .

• Assume we want to assign a type to a sorting function sort on

Dependent Types for Writing Verified Programs

lists of natural numbers.

• We assume some notion of NatList (list of natural numbers).

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SortedList			Sorted Lists		

- What is SortedList?
 - An element of SortedList is a list which is sorted.
 - It is a pair $\langle I, p \rangle$ s.t.
 - / is a NatList.
 - *p* is a proof or verification that *l* is sorted:
 - p : Sorted(1).

- For the moment, ignore what is meant by Sorted(I) as a type.
- Only important: Sorted(1) depends on 1.
 - Sorted(1) is a predicate expressed as a type.
- Elements of SortedList are pairs $\langle I, p \rangle$ s.t.
 - / : NatList.
 - p : Sorted(I).
- Sorted(*I*) is a dependent type.

Sorted Lists (Cont.)

- An element of Sorted(*I*) will be a **proof** that *I* is sorted.
- If *I* is sorted, then Sorted(*I*) will be provable, and therefore will have an element.
 - It is possible to write a program which computes an element of Sorted(1).
- If *I* is **not sorted**, then Sorted(*I*) will have no proof and it will therefore **no element**.
 - Then it is not possible to write a program which computes an element of Sorted(*I*).

The Dependent Product

• Then the pair $\langle I, p \rangle$ will be an element of

SortedList := $(I : NatList) \times Sorted(I)$.

- SortedList is the type of pairs $\langle I, p \rangle$ s.t.
 - I : NatList,
 - p : Sorted(I).

called the dependent product

- sort : NatList \rightarrow ((l : NatList) \times Sorted(l)) expresses:
 - sort converts lists into sorted lists.

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The Dependent Fu	nction Type		The Dependent F	unction Type	

- From a sorting function we know more:
 - It takes a list and converts it into a sorted list with the same elements.
- Assume a type (or predicate) EqElements(I, I') standing for
 - I and I' have the same elements.

• A refined version of sort has type

 $(I : \text{NatList}) \rightarrow ((I' : \text{NatList}) \times \text{Sorted}(I') \times \text{EqElements}(I, I'))$

- "sort(1) is a list, which is sorted and has the same elements".
- "sort is a program, which takes a list and returns a sorted list with the same elements."
- The type of sort is an instance of the **dependent function type**:
 - The result type depends on the arguments.

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Topics in Security

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- Cyberterrorism, General Security
 - Monika Seisenberger, Anton Setzer.
- Cryptocurrencies (Bitcoins, Blockchain).
 - Anton Setzer

CSCM10	Specification and Verification	53/ 58	CSCM10	Specification and Verification	54/
	Theoretical Topics				
1 Critical Systems					
2 Specification			 Computability Theory and Limits of Computation Ulrich Berger, Jens Blanck, Monika Seisenberger, John Tucker, 		
3 Verification		 Exact Real Number Computation Ulrich Berger, Jens Blanck, Monika Seisenberger. 			
Dependent Type Theory			Program ExtractionUlrich Berger, Monika Seisenberger		
5 Security				ckmann, Ulrich Berger, Monika Seisenb an Razafindrakoto.	erger, Anton

- Complexity Theory
 - Arnold Beckmann, Oliver Kullmann, Faron Moller, Jean Razafindrakoto.
- Formal Argumentation
 - X. Fan.

Conclusion

- Critical Systems require more formal specification and verification.
- Expertise in Swansea in specification and verification.
- Problems of natural language specification can be overcome by formal specification.
- Verification techniques from proving by hand to interactive and automated theorem proving.
- Agda as an example of a programming language based on dependent types.
- Use of dependent types for generative programming.
- Research related to Security.

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• Wide range of theoretical topics covered in Swansea.

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Specification and Verification

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Specification and Verification